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( Tr. 79). Manning, the defendant, \Yas the only person
who measured it. There was no visible evidence 1narking
the center of the highway. ( Tr. -t3). The baiTO\\T pit
sloped down from the hard shoulders to a depth of about
2 feet at its deepest point. An automobile could safely
·be driven from the paved portion of the highway across
the hard or compact shoulder about 7 feet in width into
or across the barrow pit. The distance fro1n 2nd Street,
where appellant testified the fog became more dens€\
thereby reducing visibility to the point of impact, was
one-half mile or more. (Tr. 47). The location of defendant's car when W eenig first saw it is in dispute.
Weenig is the only witness who placed it parallel with
the truck. All of the other evidence, including the
physical facts, place defendant's car two or three car
lengths to the rear of the truck (Tr. 69 to 71 inclusive).
Weenig is the only witness \Vho fixes his speed as 30
miles per hour and he admitted that he had not looked
at his speedometer since he crossed 2nd Street, a half
mile or more south of the scene of the accident, at whirh
time he says he was travelling 35 n1iles per hour. (Tr. 60).
Manning fixed W eenig 's speed in excess of 40 n1iles
per hour ( Tr. 74), and Professor Carter, the expert witness, considering the physical facts, eomputed Manning's
speed at as high as 54 3/4 miles per hour. (Tr. 119-122).
He further testified that if visibility were as \Yeenigstated, that is, 50 feet, a safe driving speed \vould hav<\
been 23 miles per hour. If, as l\fanning testified, 8-+
feet, a safe driving speed ~Tould have been 30 1niles per
hour (Tr. 132). Manning at no ti1ne stated he had turned
out to pass a south bound vehiclP. What h<' did statP
was that he had swerved to the lPft far enough to a~<·Pr2
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tain if it ,yere safe to pass. The preponderance of the
e-;~idence is to the effect that the impact occurred less
than 3 feet e~1st of the center of the highvvay. ( Tr. 41,
43, 5~~ 5:1~ 61). The defendant 'vas headed back onto his
side of the higlnvay and 'vas struck by the Weenig car
a. glancing blo'v on the left side of the left front fender
near the door of his car. (Tr. 71).
There \vas ample roon1 on the paved portion of the
high,vay east of the point of impact, (at least 8 feet),
for Weenig to have passed the defendant's car safely,
and 7 feet of hard shoulder on the same elevation east
of that. (Tr. 58). Weenig's car was 5 feet 5¥2 inches
wide. (Tr. 41, 43, 52, 59 and 105). Passing vehicles by
other vehicles going in the same direction in the locality
of the accident was a lawful movement and not prohibited.
Appellant relies on the follo,ving statement of
points:

POINT I
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN A-lAKING AND ENTERING FINDING OF FACT No. 5 TO THE EFFE'CT
THAT THE PLAINTIFF CORPORATION'S TRUCK AUTOMOBILE WAS OF THE REASONABLE VALUE OF
$1,020.00 AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT FOR THE
REA'SOl\r THAT IT WAS STIPULATED BY COUNSEL
FOR THE DEFENDANT AT TRIAL THAT SAID
TRUCK'S REASONABLE VALUE WAS $1,370.00 AND
THAT THE SALVAGE VALUE THEREOF WAS $300.00,
MAKING A NET LOSS TO TifE PLAINTIFF OF $1,070.00
AS A RESULT OF THE ACCIDENT WITH DEFENDANT.''

POINT II
''THE TRIAL COURT ERRE.D IN FINDING THAT

3
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PLAINTIFF CORPORATION'S E~fPLOYEE WAS DRIVING ITS TRUCK AT A SPEED OF BETWEEN 46 AND
53 MILES PER H·OUR AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT, WITH DE·FENDANT ON THE GROUND AND
FOR THE REASON THAT SAID FINDING IS WHOLLY
UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE."

POINT III
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE DAMAGES SUSTAINE.D TO PLAINTIFF CORPORATION'S TRUCK WERE NOT THE RESULT OF
ANY CARELESSNESS OR NEGLIGENCE ON THE
PART OF THE DEFENDANT FOR THE REASON THAT
SUCI-I A FINDING IS UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND CONTRARY TO LAW."

POINT I\T
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE SPEED OF PLAINTIFF CORPORATION'S TRUCK
WAS NEGLIGEN:CE ON THE PART OF ITS DRIVER
WHICII CONTRIBUTED TO THE DAMAGES SUSTAINED BY PLAINTIFF ON THE GROUND AND FOR
THE REASON THAT SUCH A FINDING IS UNSUP. PORTE·D BY THE EVIDENCE AND CONTRARY TO
LAW."

POINT V
"THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
THE CONCLUSION'S OF LAW, AND THE JUDGEMENT
OF NO CAUSE OF ACTION IS CONTRARY TO LAW."

ARGUMENT
POINT I
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING FINDING OF FACT No. 5 TO THE EFFECT
THAT THE PLAINTIFF CORPORATION'S TRUCK AU·
TOMOBILE WAS OF THE REASONABLE VALUE OF
4
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$1,020.00 AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT FOR THE
REASON THAT IT WAS STIPULATED BY COUNSEL
FOR THE DEFENDANT AT TRIAL THAT SAID
TRUCK'S REASONABLE VALUE WAS $1,370.00 AND
THAT THE SALVAGE VALUE THEREOF WAS $300.00,
MAKING A NE'T Lo·ss TO THE PLAINTIFF OF $1,070.00
AS A RESULT OF THE ACCIDENT WITH DEFENDANT.''

Appellant says at Page 8 of his brief:
***"At the trial of this case, counsel for defendant,
~L Nephi Manning, stipulated in the record ·that
the reasonable value of the plaintiff corporation's
truck at the time of the collision with the defendant
was $1,370.00, and that the sum of $300.00 was received by the plaintiff as salvage, making a total
or net loss of $1,070.00 ( Tr. 2 and 65). This was
an unequivocal stipulation on the part of defendant's
counsel, with no evidence contrary thereto in the
record. We believe this error in figures was an
oversight on the part of defendant's counsel in his
preparation of the findings of fact and 'vill be confessed in his responding brief.''
There was no unequivocal stipulation that plaintiff's
net loss was $1,070.00 as stated in appellant's brief;
there was, however, a stipulation that if plaintiff presented the witness who estimated the value of plaintiff's
truck, at the time of the collision, at $1,370.00, and fixed
the value of the salvage at $300.00, he would testify that
these amounts were reasonable; that is the only stipulation with respect to values. Apparently, however, in the
drafting of the findings, by typographical error, the net
figure was written in finding No. 5 as $1,020.00; since
there was no contrary evidence, respondent readily ad5
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mits that the net loss, in the finding, should probably
have been stated as $1,070.00, however, in view of the
court's further findings, the difference in the an1ount is
imn1aterial and does not constitute reversible error, tl1us
the respondant was not harmed.

POINT II
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
PLAINTIFF CORPORATION'S EMPLOYE,E WAS DRIVING ITS TRUCK AT A SPEED O·F BETWEEN 46 AND
53 MILES PER HOUR AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT, WITH DEFENDANT ON THE GROUND AND
FOR THE REASON TI-IAT SAID FINDING IS WHOLLY
UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE."

There is ample, competent evidence in the reeord
from which the trial court could find the speed of plaintiff's car was from 46 to 53 or even 543;4 n1iles per hour.
Defendant not only testified that "\V eenig was coining''at a frightening speed'' but added ''in excess of 40
n1iles per hour" ( Tr. 74). Adn1itting that defendant
might not have been in position to accurately judg-P
speed, yet his testimony is material in view of the sudden impact after first seeing Weenig's lights. To that~
however, must be added all of the testilnony of the Witness Carter, as shown in .the Tr. pg. 119-122 inclusive,
also Card (Tr. 64), to all of which we respectfully rail
this Honorable Court's attention.
Appellant most severely restricted the evidence on
the number of times Weenig's car rolled. The investigating officer said "I would say the car rolled over sevPral
times·" (Tr. 55). Upon further questioning by coun~Pl
for plaintiff, the following appears:
Q.

"Did you 1neasure the distanrP between
6
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tlu~

physical evidence of \Yhere the car first tipped
fron1 the shoulder to \\"here it came to rest on
its top~"
A.

'~ Approxi1nately

Q.

'~So

A.

"Approximately."

23 steps, about 70 feet.''

that the W eenig car travelled on its wheels
and rolled a total distance of 40 plus 70 or in
the neighborhood of 120 feet~''

Card testified it rolled 2¥2 or 3 times (Tr. 64).
Defendant testified:
of ''skid or tire marks made by the W eenig car
plainly visible to the edge of the highway and gouges
in the shoulders.'' ( Tr. 77 & 80).
Carter testified that immediately after the impact
the W eenig car started turning counterclockwise ( Tr.
114) which "\vould require the wheels of the car to go
sidewise with the wheels skidding rather than straight
forward with the wheels rolling. This testimony was
brought out by 1Ir. Bayle in response to the following
question:

Q. ''Does this assume the brakes were applied all
the time until it turned
A.

over~''

''According to the testimony this morning of
Mr. Weenig and according to my deductions and
reconstructing the accident, the car went in a
counterclockwise spin, therefore, while in the
spin would leave rubber pending the skid and
that could be even more forcible or greater than
actually locked wheels skidding, so this vehicle
went through this position and went into a skid
7
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in this manner, that is 'vhat put it in right angles
to the center line of the highway so it was skidding, therefore, you wou~d have a side skid.''
"If this was 40 feet or whatever it was measured, the vehicle actually, since the center of
gravity was back here or .here or 'vhatever
would be the center of gravity, the distance of
three feet, therefore, you 'vould have a side
skid.''

Q.

''It would make no difference how far the
vehicle was turned to right angles to the momentum in the highway?"

A.

''I don't think it would make enough difference
to give it any consideration or if the vehicle is
going into a skid and movin.g forward, the center of gravity moving forward 30 feet, moving
diagonally in that distance, whatever it is, all
four wheels are skidding. It may not lay down
rubber."

Q.

''Suppose the wheel is on loose

A.

"Yes, on loose gravel or sand, unless it is loose,
it makes ball bearings; if solid and hard it woulrl
slow it up more. What is the condition~''

gravel~''

Q. "Assuming it is a hard graveled surface.''
A.

"That kind could slow it down ntore than otherwise unless a volume of loose gravel. Most of
our shoulders are pretty well co1npacted. ''

MR. BAYLE : ''The shoulder of the road up that
way, the shoulder of the road was not a Inacadan1ized
type of highway?"
8
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.\.

~·\\Tell,

as I understand jt, I have driven that
many tin1es, the pavement itself is solidified oil
and gravel, that is "\vhy I call the shoulders pretty "\veil stabilized. I don't know whether there
is any grass on it but there could be. We find
in our tests on gravel between the skidding perforn1anre on gravel, 'Ne find the tires get into
the hard surfaces and slo'v the vehicle down
Inore than on the oil. That is the usual experience I have had 'vith gravel such as the shoulders are." (Tr. 114, 115, 116).

The defendant admitted the same as follows:

Q.

'' _A._t the time of the impact, after this accident,
what happened to your vehicle in the way of
swerVIng or at all changing directions? Can
you state?''

A.

''Yes, I can. 1t seen1ed to turn sidewise, as Professor Carter stated, it just swerved that way."
(Tr. 126).

See also the testimony of the Deputy Sheriff Card
as to skid marks (Tr. 53).
This evidence is certainly competent and considered
together 'vith the calculations of the expert Carter to the
effect that the speed of W eenig's car, based upon the
physical facts ~ould have been as much as 5434 miles
l>Pr hour was sufficient upon which the finding could be
n1ade. The findings of the court were based upon that
evidence.
The testimony of H. B. Carter, the expert witness,
i~ found in the transcript pages 100 to 126. In the interests of tiine and space, that evidence will not be set
9
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out hec verba ' but a summation onlv.
The 'vitness is
..
professor of the Civil Engineering at the University of
Utah. He was previously professor of highway engineering at the UAC. His qualifications are found at
pages 107 and 108 in the transcript.
He testified that the panel truck of the plaintiffs
was 23 feet in eircun1ference; that if it rolled 70 feet that
would mean 21j2 rolls (Tr. 116) which would mean a
speed of 39lf2 miles per hour without accounting for the
40 foot ·skid. 31j2 rolls would result from a 463J.t, n1ile per
hour speed (Tr. 117), and that taking into consideration
the 40 foot skid before tipping over, as the evidence
shows, and rolling 21j2 times, the speed would have been
48.8 miles per hour instead of 391j2 • If the car had rolled
11j2 times with the skid, the car would have been travelling 42 miles per hour, but if it rolled 3% times, taking
into consideration, the skid, it would have been travelling at 543J.t, miles per hour ( Tr. 119).
Carter's conclusions were based upon the testimony
of other witnesses, including Weenig plaintiff's agent,
and the physical facts and is the strongest kind of
evidence.
POINT III
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE DAMAGES SUSTAINED TO PLAINTIFF CORPORATION'S TRUCK WERE NOT THE RESULT OF
ANY CARELESSNESS OR NEGLIGENCE ON THE
PART OF THE DEFENDANT FOR THE REASON THAT
SUCH A FINDING IS UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND CONTRARY TO LAW.''

POINT 1\r
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT

10

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TI-!E SPEED OF PLAINTIFF CORPORATION'S TRUCK
vV.l\.S NEGLIGENCE ON TI-IE PART OF ITS DRIVER
\VHICH CONTRIBUTED TO THE DAMAGE'S SUSTAINED BY PLAINTIFF ON THE GROUND AND FO;R
TI1E REASON TI-IAT SUCH A FINDING IS UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND CONTRARY TO
LAW."

The court's finding No. 8 that the damage to the
plaintiff's car did not result fron1 the carelessness and
negligence of the defendant but resulted from the careless, negligent and unlawful manner in 'vhich plaintiff's
auton1obile "\\ras operated at said time and place ''*and
that said damages resulted proximately from the careless, negligent and unlawful 1nanner in which its said
auton1ohile "\Vas being driven'' is adequately, fully and
eo1npletely supported by the evidence in the case.
The expert witness Carter testified that the reacting
time, after the driver sensed his peril, was 34 of a second.
At 42 n1iles per hour, plaintiff's car would travel 46.2
feet before the brakes \Vould apply. At 48.8 miles per
hour, the car would travel 53.7 feet, a greater distance
than plaintiff's witness testjfied to as the distance of
visibility; at 5434 n1iles per hour, the car would travel
60.3 feet before the brakes would apply. l-Ie further
testified that the stopping distance, under the conditions
testified to, that is, a possible 54% miles per hour, was
21-t- feet. At 40.45 miles per hour, 131 feet, at 48.8 miles
per hour 169 feet. ( Tr. 119-122). He further testified
that a safe driving speed with 50 feet visibility, as testified to hy plaintiff'~ agent, was 23 miles per hour. If
the visibility was 84 feet, which is approximately the testiinony of the defendant, a safe driving speed was 30
1niles per hour. ( Tr. 122).
11
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There is no evidence in the record of a substantial
nature, considering all the physical facts, that the speed
of the W eenig car was as little as 30 n1iles per hour. The
posted speed li1nit in the area where the accident occurred, under ideal conditions, was 40 miles per hour.
(Tr. 74).
All of the evidence is to the effect that the defendant
turned to his left to determine if he could safely pass
the large truck immediately preceding him in the saine
direction. Immediately upon seeing the headlights fron1
plaintiff's car he turned to the right and was traveling
in a southwesterly direction when struck by plaintiff'~
car midway between the front of his car and the door on
his left side. The evidence puts the left side of defendant's car, where hit, at less than three feet east of the
center of the highway (Tr. 41, 43, 52, 53) with no physical evidence that plaintiff's car swerved at all until just
about the moment of the impact in any effort to avoid
the collision which resulted undoubtedly, from (a) plaintiff's driver failing to keep a proper or any lookout
for objects upon the highway in front of him, or (b)
Traveling at such a rapid rate of speed that his reaeting
time did not allow him to swerve. The latter case, under
all the facts and the evidence, being more than likely.
That being so, his speed was the proximate cause of the
collision. Had he been driving at a lawful and saf<'
speed, defendant would have had ainple time to get back
in his own lane of traffic and plaintiff would have had
ample time to avoid the accident by swerving, and the
evidence shows he had arnple room, at least 8 feet on
the macadamized surface of the high,va~r, within '"hieh
to pass safely even with defendant's car in tJH~ position
where plaintiff caine upon it with an additional 7 foot
12

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

shoulder. Plaintiff apparently relies wholly upon Section 41-6-53 UCA 1953, \Yith respect to overtaking and
passing another motor Yehicle proceeding in the same
direction. He ignores con1pletely the provisions of 41-646 'vith respect to speed regulations which reads in part
as follows:
(a)

''No person shall drive a vehicle on a highway
at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard
to the actual and potential hazards then existing. In every event speed shall be so controlled
as may be necessary to avoid colliding with any
person, vehicle or other conveyance on or entering the highway in compliance with legal
requirements and the duty of all persons to
use due care.'' * * *

(c)

''The driver of every vehicle shall consistant
with the requirements of subdivision (a) of
this Section, drive at an appropriate reduced
speed" * * "when special hazard exists, with
respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by
reason of weather or highway conditions.''
(italics ours).

The duty to use caution in the speed of his driving
bore just as heavily upon the plaintiff under the conditions of limited visibility as the duty to use caution in
passing other vehicles traveling in the same direction
weighed upon the defendant. Under the state of the
evidence there was no apparent effort on the part of the
plaintiff to use caution except his own uncorroborated
testi1nony which, even if there were no evidence to the
contrary, proves conclusively that he was not using due

13
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caution since he himself aillnitted he 'vas travelling 35
miles per hour when he last looked at his speedometer,
a half mile away.
As the writer recalls it, there is no testimony by
anyone that he reduced speed, but all of the physical
facts indicate that he increased his speed, notwithstanding his admission that the fog grew thicker and 1nore
dense and the visibility decreased. Contrasted 'vith that,
the preponderance of the evidence is to the effect that
the defendant carefully and cautiously investigated ·while
he was 3 or 4 lengths behind the truck to deternrine if,
under the circumstances, it was safe for hin1 to pass. (Tr.
70) He did everything a prudent man would have done,
under the circumstances, to avoid the accident, but because of the speed of the plaintiff's car, he was unable to
escape, not because he was where he was, but because of
the failure of plaintiff's agent to keep a lookout or because of the speed of the plaintiff's car or both. No reasonable person would say that had plaintiff's rar been
driven at a safe speed under the circumstances, to-\\~it,
about 23 miles per hour, that the accident would not
have been avoided.
All of the cases cited by appellant are clearly and
readily distinguishable from the instant case. If, in thr
instant case, the defendant had sued the plaintiff for
damages resulting to his car by reason of the accident,
(which he did not), the court might have found against
his recovery because of son1e contributory nPgligence,
however, that is not the case here. Plaintiff sued thr'
defendant.
As the writer re1ne1nbers appellant 'H ra~ns~ Inost if
not all of them turned on the question of ( 1) ('Ontributory

14
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negligence, or ( ~) that the jury \Vas the sole judges of
the evidence and it was their province to deter1nine which
of the parties \vas guilty of negligence. It 1nust be
further ren1e1nbered that the instant case was not tried
before a jury and so the learned trial judge \vas the trier
both of the facts and the la\v and his judgment upon all
questions of fact, (and the question of negligence is one
of fact), SY\"eet vs. Salt Lake City, 43 U. 306 134 P. 1167,
and if supported by any con1petent evidence, will not be
disturbed by this court. Stangle YS. Smith, 10 Wash.
2nd 461 170 P. (2) 207.
We do not wish to lengthen respondent's brief by
long quotations fro1n appellant's cases. A brief statement, we assume, will be sufficient since the court will
undoubtedly peruse all cases cited.
Bragdon vs. Kellogg, 105 Atl. 433. 6 ALR 669, involved
two cars approaching each other from opposite directions
on a road of ample width to allow two cars to pass each
other without any danger of interference. The case occurred prior to the advent of the automobile and the
accident happened as the t'vo vehicles involved were approaching an intersection of two streets running at right
angles \vith each other, each of them intending to turn.
The one vehicle was on the wrong side of the road with
no explanation and claimed he had the right to drive on
any part of the street. I-Ie sued and the court found that
he \vas guilty of contributory negligence, and the court
so found even though the defendant may also have been
gnilty of negligence.
In the O'M~lley vs. Egan case (Wyo.) 77 ALR 582,
the eourt laid do\vn the rule that
''plaintiff, in action for personal injuries, must

15
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show not only that defendant was negligent but also
that such negligence was the proximate cause of the
injury".
The court further said :
''The question of proximate cause is ordinarily for
the jury''.
In that case plaintiff turned abruptly onto the wron'g
side of the street in front of the defendant and the court
found that there was no evidence that driving at any
speed the defendant could have avoided the accident.
There was no apparent reason for the plaintiff turning
in front of the defendant and he made no attempt to turn
back to avoid the accident.
In Snook vs. Long, 21 ALR 1, the driver of plaintiff's car made no effort to turn to the right and thus
avoid the collision, and the court in that case, said
"Negligence is the proximate cause of an injury
which follows such negligent act if it can fairly be
said that in the absence of such negligence, the injury or damage complained of, would not have orcurred.''
With cited case. The court said further, where tl1rre i~
evidence of a legal excuse for the violation of Statute if
one is violated the question is one .for the jury to determine. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of
defendant who had the right of way. The judgn1ent of
the trial court was reversed, notwithstanding the plaintiff was on the wrong side of the road. This, too, is a
head on collision case.
Staten vs. 'Vestern I\fa<'aroni ( ~on1pan~., 5:2 TT. 42(i

16

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17 -l: I). 821, inYolved a deliYery \Yagon being drawn by
a hor~e driven by defendant's agent along the wrong
side of the street, not n1on1entaril~~ or for any apparent
reason~ and "~ith no sho'vn effort to avoid oncon1ing traffic. His horse becan1e frightened and suddenly lunged
into the Inotorryrle ridden by plaintiff. This court held
and properly so, that under the evidence, the jury, as
trier of the facts, \YP.S clothed with authority to determine 'vhether plaintiff's agent was guilty of negligence.
The court further held that, the Statute cited, Section 1143-C3 con1piled la,Ys of Utah 1907, did not forbid one
fron1 traveling upon any part of the road

"which best suits his pleasure and convenience, but
one doing so must, at all times, be regardful of those
'vho are passing or seeking to pass in the opposite
direction or seasonably turn to the right''.
as defendant did in the instant case.
Riehards vs. Palace I_jaundry Company 186 P. 439,
jnvolved a plaintiff \Yho vvas riding a bicycle so close to
the center of the highway with no apparent reason for
being there, that 'vhen one wheel of the vehicle came in
contact 'vith the street car track groove, he fell and was
thrown over the center of the highway and into the path
of an oncoming automobile from the opposite direction.
He sued to reeover damages. There was no question of
:--:1)eed on the part of either party. Visibility was perfect
and the accident resulted fro1n a sudden emergency when
the defendant was not more than 5 to 6 feet away. The
case involved the ''last clear chance or discovered peril
doctrine". This court said in quoting with approval
fro1n Presser vs. Dougherty 239 P. 312 86 ATL. 854,
"the mere fact that plaintiff collided with this auto-
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mobile does not raise any presumption of negligence,
especially where plaintiff was riding on the \Yrong
side of the street and there was no evidence that the
automobile was being operated at a dan,r;erous rate
of speed"*. (Italics ours).
There was no circumstance in that case requiring
the defendant to exercise extraordinary care, reasonable
care was all that was required. This court said:
''Nevertheless the driver (defendant on his own
side of the street) (ours), was required to exercise
reasonable care under all the circumstances, that is
to keep such a lookout as the conditions surrounding
him required"*.
and further said :
'''or that his (defendant) conduct in operating the
truck was such that from which negligence could be
inferred, this case would be different.''*
Purdie vs. Brunswick, Wash., 146 P. (2) 809; was a
case under a provision of the Wash. Rem. Rev. Stat 17 A
Section 6360-75, Substantially the same as our Statute,
Section 41-6-63 UCA 43 the Washington Statute is perhaps even more restrictive than our section above quoted.
The facts of the case are set forth in the men1orandun1
of the trial court in the center paragraph, first colu1nn,
Page 811. The weather was clear, the pave1nent \va~ dr~·.
the general visibility was good. Respondent was driving
as an ordinary prudent person upon the occasion in
question. Appellant was driving at an exePssive rate
of speed under the existing circun1stances. llis continued invasion of his left hand side of the road was at
a point where he had no right or occasion then to be.
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Innnediately before the impact appellant 'vas driving
in an eratic course across the center line of the highway
confusing to the respondent. He failed to observe respondent's car although he had an1ple opportunity to do
BO. Of course, under those rircu1nstances, he could not
recover and ":re fail to see ho'v appellant can take any
comfort fron1 the rules of la""' laid down in that case.
In Turrietto vs. \\Tyche 5-t N.M. 5, 212 P. (2) 1041,
the court held
''question as to 'vhether defendant's negligence was
proxilnate cause of plaintiff's injury was for the
jury." Syllibus (3) (7).
In that case plaintiff was on his lawful side of the
street, there were no obstructions, visibility was good and
the defendant was driving down the highway with the
left wheels generally left of the center of the highway
and the body of the truck which was 8 feet wide protruding out further. Plaintiff pulled his car to the right but
was unable to pull off the highway far enough to avoid
being sideswiped by defendant's car. The New Mexico
Statute was Section 68 511 N.l\f. Stat. 1941, with respect
to passing to the right and contained no exceptions.
There was no claim that defendant could not have turned
to the right far enough to avoid the accident. No excuse
was shown for his encroachment on plaintiff's half, yet
the Supreme Court held that whether his negligence was
the proximate cause of the accident was for the jury.
Pg. 1043.
In Ankenny vs. Talbot (Colo.) 250 P. (2) 1019,
defendant was driving north on the highway at a hill,
he started to angle off to the left side in the lane of oneorning traffic to reach a mail box on the opposite side
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tance at \vhich operator of said car is able to see
objerts upon the highway in front of him.''
See also Hanson vs. Clyde 89 U. 31, 56 P. (2) 1366
104 ALR 943, the latter case particularly involved visibiliy as in the instant case, where this court held that it
has long been the rule in this state that it is negligence,
as a matter of law, to drive an automobile upon a
traveled public highway at such rate of speed that said
automobile cannot be stopped within distance at which
operator of said car is able to see. In the latter case,
this court held that when a driver upon a public highway,
with his light equipment, cannot see more than 50 feet
ahead of him, it is his duty to drive at such speed as will
enable him to stop within that distance. As the evidence
clearly shows, in this cas-e, plaintiff could not possibly
have stopped his car within 50 feet, the range of his
visibility as testified to by him, at the speed he was going,
or even at the speed he admitted he was going. O'Brien
vs. Allston etal 61 U t. 368, 213 P. 791.
In Sweet vs. Salt Lake City 43 U. 306 134 P. 1167,
this court held that whether the speed at which a vehicle
was going at the time, was the proximate cause of the
accident, is a question of fact.
O'Brien vs. Allston case supra contributary negligence and proximate cause are discussed. See also
Horseley vs. Robinson 112 U. 227, 186 P. (2) 592.
Nickoleropoelas vs. Ramsey 61 U. 465, 214 P. 304. Fisher
vs. O'Brien 99 Kan. 621, 162 P. 317. Lawson vs. Fondelac 141 Wis. 57, 123 NW 629.
In the 0 'Brien case supra, plaintiff, the operator of
the motor vehicle sued the defendant for negligence for
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placing a barricade across the highway, this court l1eld
that plaintiff was driving at an unreasonable rate of
speed (27 miles per hour). Under the circun1stances
(visibility poor)) and hence was guilty of contributory
negligence and could not recover.

POINT V
"THAT TIIERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND THE JUDGEMENT
OF NO CAUSE OF ACTION IS CONTRARY TO LAW."

In view of the foregoing analysis of the evidence
and the law, we assume there is no need for further conlment under point 5, except to say that there is absolutely
no evidence in the record that the defendant failed to
keep or maintain a proper lookout, all of the evidence
on the contrary is to the effect that he did just that, but
that the failure was on the part of the plaintiff.
We respectfully submit, therefore, under the law
and the facts, in this case, that the findings and judgment of the learned trial court are amply supported hy
the evidence and should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
HUGGINS & HUGGINS
Attorneys for Respondent
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